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Abstract: 
Money is usually regarded as a subject in the domain of economists, but it is really a 
fundamentally legal notion. In fact, it is a creation of the law. Money is a special object of 
property, and at the same time a form of debt, enforceable by law which ultimately confers on 
it the quality of money. The concept of dematerialised property assists in describing the 
concept of money accurately. The article discusses the different types of money, and the 
creation of money through central banks and through commercial banks by giving credit. It 
explores the possible legal foundation of this money creation process. The discussion also 
looks at the legal regulation of money creation in Germany and presents findings from an 
interview with a practising commercial lawyer in Germany which confirm the author’s thesis 
that money is a legally enforceable debt. 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Money is indisputably a fundamental concept in commercial law, but lawyers rarely 
examine the essence and legal qualities of money. They do discuss the function of 
money in commercial transactions, and current commercial law and banking law 
textbooks attest to that.1 But they hardly consider the legal concept itself – what 
money is in law, not what it does, only how it is owned, transferred, traced and the 
like, but not how it comes into existence in law and what its own specific legal 
qualities and effects are. Payment through money is more worthy of investigation than 
money itself. Money is apparently a phenomenon which the law has to deal with, but 
not a conception which may even be the product of law, not just mere recognition by 
the law. Money is considered as a form of personal property2 – that much is true, but 
it is obvious that this kind of personal property distinguishes itself from ordinary 
tangible or intangible property. It seems to be less obvious that debts, documentary 
intangibles and intellectual property rights are conceptually closely related to money 
                                                 
* For section 5 of this article, the author is grateful to his former student Alexander Linda, LLB 
(Glasgow), for research assistance in June 2016, and to Hans Scharpf, Attorney-at-Law in 
Frankfurt/Main, Germany, for agreeing to a research interview with him on 18 June 2015. The author 
would also like to thank the Institut d’études avancées (IEA) in Nantes, France, for a grant of €500 for 
travel and conduct of this interview during his time at the IEA as fellow (résident) during the academic 
year 2014-15. 
1  E.g. Peter Ellinger, Eva Lomnicka, Christopher Hare, Ellinger’s Modern Banking Law, 5th ed 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 119-125; Ewan McKendrick, Goode on Commercial Law, 5th 
ed (London: Penguin 2016), 488. 
2 Michael Bridge, Personal Property Law, 4th ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 21. 
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and assist greatly in explaining the legal concept, not just the legal meaning, of 
money. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries legal scholars saw money as an 
essential part of private law and devoted much discussion to money as such. William 
Blackstone, 3  Friedrich Carl v. Savigny, 4  Bernhard Windscheid 5  or Levin 
Goldschmidt6 had a lot to say about money, but they based their analyses on now 
antiquated monetary systems and are therefore unfortunately of limited importance 
today. Probably around the beginning of the twentieth century lawyers ceded quietly 
their competence in speaking scientifically about money to the economists,7 and the 
establishment of the neo-classical school, especially the Cambridge School headed by 
Alfred Marshall 8  as well as the increasing mathematisation of economics as a 
discipline appear to have played a significant role in this development. 
Today legal scholars approach the matter of money with a certain diffidence. 
The seminal legal text on money by F. A. Mann illustrates this:9  
‘The troublesome question, What is money? has so constantly engaged the minds of 
economists that a lawyer might hesitate to join in the attempt to solve it. Yet the true 
answer must, if possible, be determined. … a great deal of a lawyer’s daily work 
centres around the term ‘money’ itself and the many transactions or institutions based 
on that term, such as debt, damages, value, payment, price, capital, interest, tax, 
pecuniary legacy.’ 
 
For Mann lawyers seem to encroach on economists’ expertise. But the various legal 
functions and institutions make up the conception of money: what money does also 
means what money is. Proctor’s later edition of Mann’s book takes over almost the 
same passage.10 A lack of sufficient theoretical examination of the legal concept of 
money may have contributed to Mann’s assertion that ‘[b]ank accounts … are debts, 
                                                 
3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England. Book The First, book 1, ch 7, 13th ed 
(Edinburgh: Strahan, Cadell, 1800), 276-278. 
4 Friedrich C v Savigny, Das Obligationenrecht als Theil des heutigen Römischen Rechts, Vol. 1 
(Berlin: Veit, 1851), § 40, 403-423, § 42, 448-456, § 43, 463-468. 
5 Bernhard Windscheid, Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 9th ed., Vol. 2, Theodor Kipp (ed) (Aalen: 
Scientia Verlag, 1963), 45, 52 and n. 32, 53 and nn. 34-35. 
6 Levin Goldschmidt, Handbuch des Handelsrechts, 1. Band, 2. Abteilung, enthaltend die Lehre von 
der Ware (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke, 1868), especially at §§ 91-99, 1060-1071: ‘A combined legal 
theory for all so-called money [coins, notes, bank money] does not exist’ (at 1071), § 105, 1142-1176, 
§§ 107-109, 1193-1231. 
7 Ludwig v. Mises (1912): ‘It does not come within the scope of the legislator or jurist to define the 
economic concept of money.’ See Ludwig v Mises, The Theory of Money and Credit (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1953), 69. Incidentally, Mises was a lawyer by training, as all founders of the 
School of Austrian economics.  
8 Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics, 8th ed (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan 2013) V, iii, 7, 291, on the equation of money costs with real costs. 
9 Francis A Mann, The Legal Aspect of Money, 4th ed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 3. 
10 Charles Proctor, Mann on the Legal Aspect of Money, 7th ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), 5-6. 
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not money’, or that ‘[m]oney is not the same as credit’,11 which indicates incomplete 
appreciation of the legal quality of extant money itself and the money supply (or 
creation) process. Proctor no longer maintains this narrow classification. 12  The 
practical-transactional approach – what money does tells us (conclusively) what 
money is – can be found more openly in Goode. He recognises the broader 
‘economic’ definition of money in that bank money and electronic money should be 
included in the meaning of ‘money’.13 But this is more a pragmatic than a conceptual 
assessment:14  
 
‘[M]uch of the debate on what constitutes money in law is rather sterile and has few 
implications for the rights of parties to commercial transactions, where payment by 
bank transfer is the almost universal method of settlement. … The crucial question … 
is not what constitutes money but what constitutes payment.’  
 
For the property theorist this is not enough. Not only is this attitude unsatisfactory for 
the scholar (it may well be adequate for the practitioner), it also overlooks the fact 
that the economy as a whole is profoundly influenced by the method with which 
money is conceptualised and created, and the choice of this method is a legal, 
normative decision, not an economic explanation of a social phenomenon. Thus one 
should try to know what money is in law.  
 
 
2 Money in Law as a Form of Dematerialised Property 
 
a) Real Rights and res 
The starting point shall be existing money that circulates and is used for payment.15 
Money is a type of personal property. Property has historically been regarded as a 
relationship between a person and a thing, an allocation of a thing to a person.16 For 
unsophisticated practical purposes, this view may be sufficient, but property theorists 
are quick to point out that property is really a legal relation between persons with 
regard to a thing.17 The relational concept of property is not new; it can be found in 
                                                 
11 Mann, 5-6. 
12 Proctor, 10-12. 
13 McKendrick, 488. 
14 McKendrick, 490. 
15 The question of money supply or money creation is discussed below under 3. 
16 E.g. Blackstone, book II chapter 1, 1. In Roman law, see Barry Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman 
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 98, 153-154. 
17 Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property (Clarendon Press 1988) 27; Antony M Honoré, 
Ownership, in Antony G Guest (ed), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (First Series) (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1961), 134. 
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eighteenth century writers already, most particularly with Kant.18  At this stage it 
becomes necessary to define the meaning of ‘property’: It can mean (a) ‘assets’ 
(patrimonium),19 (b) ‘property right’ or ‘real right’, (c) object to which the real right 
refers, the ‘thing’ in law – in the following it will be named ‘res’. Imprecise and 
unfortunate, but even found in statutes,20 is a fourth use of the term ‘property’ if it 
denotes ‘ownership’, a particular, in fact the most extensive, real right.21 For present 
purposes we are only interested in the widest but most vaguely defined real right of 
ownership,22 not in the restricted real rights (‘special property’23) or jura in re aliena, 
such as the easement or the mortgage. Nor is the characteristic division of ownership 
by quality in English law24 (unlike in Roman law-based systems25), that is, legal and 
equitable ownership,26 relevant for the further discussion. 
Real rights or rights in rem are commonly regarded as a bundle of rights, 
somewhat influenced by Hohfeld’s attempt at dissolving property rights in a multitude 
of individual rights in personam erga omnes as corresponding duty holders.27 That 
leads to highly artificial conceptions especially in the case of property transfer,28 and 
can erroneously suggest that property rights are a matter of degree. 29  One can 
reinterpret this concept with a metaphor in Spinoza’s spirit as the substance of a right 
in rem being split into a number of attributes that turn the right in rem into concrete 
individual rights in rem30 and so avoid possible misunderstandings.  
For the following discussion obligations or ‘debts’ are the most important type 
of property or res. Thus it is necessary to define the terms ‘obligation’ and ‘debt’ 
more clearly, for English legal terminology is not sufficiently consistent, in contrast to 
                                                 
18 Immanuel Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, Wilhelm Weischedel (ed) vol 8 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 
1977) Rechtslehre, § 11, 371-372. See also Andreas Rahmatian, Intellectual Property and the Concept 
of Dematerialised Property, in Susan Bright (ed), Modern Studies in Property Law, vol. 6 (Oxford and 
Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2011), 363-364. 
19 In German law ‘Vermögen’, in French law ‘biens’. 
20 E.g. Sale of Goods Act 1979, ss. 16, 17, 61 (1). 
21 Honoré, 108. 
22 In Civil Law Systems, e.g. § 903 German BGB, art. 544 French Code Civil, art. 641 Swiss ZGB. 
23 This is the term of English personal property law, see Bridge, 46, and e.g. Sale of Goods Act 1979, s. 
61 (1). 
24  Division of ownership by (legal) quality is to be distinguished from division of ownership by 
allocation, as in the case of co-ownership.  
25 Max Kaser, Das Römische Privatrecht. Erster Abschnitt. Das altrömische, das vorklassische und 
klassische Recht, 2nd ed (München: C H Beck, 1971), 124, 432. 
26  E.g. James E Penner, The Idea of Property in Law (OUP, 1997) 133; Simon Douglas, Ben 
McFarlane, Defining Property Rights, in James Penner and Henry Smith (eds), Philosophical 
Foundations of Property Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 240-243. 
27 Wesley N Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Concepts as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1966), 72. 
28 Penner, Idea of Property, 23; Rahmatian, Intellectual Property, 364. 
29 James E Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 University of California Los 
Angeles Law Review (1996) 796. 
30 Andreas Rahmatian, Lord Kames: Legal and Social Theorist (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2015), 226-227. 
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French law (la créance – l’obligation/la dette 31 ) or German law (Forderung – 
Verbindlichkeit/Schuld32). On the active side of the obligation, that of the creditor, his 
right will be called claim, on the passive side, that of the debtor, his corresponding 
duty will be called debt. ‘Obligation’ – in the present context only contractual 
obligation – refers to the legal relation or bargain33 between persons as a whole from 
which personal rights originate, and the personal rights determine these persons as 
corresponding creditors or debtors. This distinction between obligation, claim and 
debt is essential, because the obligation out of which debts arise as jura in personam 
is itself a res. 
The relationship between (b) property right and (c) property object or res 
matters for the present problem. A pear separated from its tree (an example of a 
natural chattel) or a clock (an example of a manufactured chattel) are not property per 
se. They only become property objects by virtue of the real rights or property rights 
attached to them. Real rights are relations between persons with regard to things, thus 
behavioural patterns, typically possession denoting visibly the owner’s entitlement, 
and non-interfering conduct of all others denoting non-entitlement. It is this 
behavioural pattern, prescribed by law,34 which makes the real right. Only through the 
performance of the real right the thing in question becomes ‘property’ and the law 
turns the physical thing into a property object which property law recognises, or, more 
accurately, creates. Without the law there is no property, following the philosophical 
view that property is not a natural right, as Locke says (in principle), 35  but a 
conventional right, as especially Hume36 and Bentham37 maintain. Thus the real right 
creates the thing or res for the purpose of the law.38  The thing is only property 
because somebody has (or could have: res nullius) property rights in it. The property 
object is a legal, normative concept, and the law typifies concrete physical objects as 
legal res. The pear only exists in property law because the real rights attached to it 
have transformed it normatively into the legal concept of a res. The pear or the clock 
                                                 
31  This is the usual term for monetary debts in French law, see René Savatier, La théorie des 
obligations en droit privé économique, 4th ed (Paris: Dalloz, 1979), 13. 
32 Helmut Köhler, BGB Allgemeiner Teil, 27th ed (München: C H Beck, 2003), § 17 n. 33, 283. 
33 The equivalent in German law would probably be ‘Rechtsgeschäft’, see e.g. Köhler, § 5, n. 5 (n 32), 
43. 
34  On the Scandinavian Realist aspect of this argumentation, see Jes Bjarup, Scepticism and 
Scandinavian Legal Realists, in Timothy Endicott, Joshua Getzler, Edwin Peel (eds), Properties of 
Law. Essays in Honour of Jim Harris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 61-62. 
35 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 2nd ed., 24th printing, Peter Laslett (ed) (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), Second Treatise, ch 5, §§ 26-27, 286-288. 
36 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Lewis A Selby-Bigge (ed) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1960), Bk 3, pt 2, sec 2, 491: ‘The origin of justice explains that of property. The same artifice gives 
rise to both.’ 
37 Jeremy Bentham, ‘Principles of the Civil Code in The Theory of Legislation, 7th ed., (London: Kegan 
Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1896), 113. 
38 Rahmatian, Intellectual Property, 364; Rahmatian, Lord Kames, 228-229. 
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are physical instances of the abstract legal, normative concept of the res: ‘This pear 
shall be a res’ by virtue of the real rights attached to it and exercisable by the right 
holder, forcing erga omnes a corresponding behavioral pattern.  
 
b) Dematerialisation and Reification 
The legal notion of the res does not require physical instances or objects of the real 
world. This is the concept of dematerialised property. ‘Property’ is necessarily an 
abstract legal concept that is detached from any physicality, even in case of tangible 
property.39 For the expert in English land law this is nothing new, because the idea of 
holding an estate in land is also an ancient abstract concept detached from the 
physicality of a given plot of land.40 In case of personal property, a physical pear is a 
concrete social reifier of the underlying and conceptual res, thus it is not the res, it 
only represents it. There are different versions of reification of the res: through 
tangible objects, intangibles (such as electricity), and pure intangibles (such as an 
intellectual property right). 41  (Versions of reification are tangible or intangible 
objects, while instances of reification are, e.g., one or the other pear.) The best 
example for pure intangibles are intellectual property rights. The physical copy of a 
book is a social reifier of the personal property-res and, at the same time, indirectly42 
of the copyright-res of the text as being an original and recorded literary work.43 A 
patented machine is the social reifier of the personal property-res and indirectly of the 
patent-res, the monopolised invention as delineated by the claims and supporting 
description of the patent as granted in the B-publication,44 since the actual patent, the 
notional realm of property, is defined by the text, not the machine.45 
There is a perceived kinship between intellectual property rights and claims 
arising from obligations. English law even defines intellectual property rights as 
choses in action.46 Other jurisdictions do not specifically, but the similarity comes to 
the fore in the case of assignment of intellectual property rights, which are modelled 
                                                 
39 Some traditional property lawyers still find that difficult to accept, see Ben McFarlane, The Structure 
of Property Law (Oxford and Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2008), 132-134. 
40 See Kevin Gray, Susan F Gray, Elements of Land Law, 5th ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), 57. 
41 Bridge, 14-19. 
42 ‘Indirectly’ because the copyright-res requires the physicality of the social reifier (provided there is a 
social reifier), which also invariably acts as a social reifier of a normal personal property-res because 
there is a physical object. This does not apply conversely: personal property does not normally have an 
intellectual property right behind. 
43 CPDA 1988, s. 1(1)(a). 
44 Patent Act 1977, ss. 1(1), 14(5), 18(4), 24. 
45 Buchanan v. Alba Diagnostics [2001] RPC (43) 851, IH, paras. 58-59; Rahmatian, Intellectual 
Property, 372-374, 376. 
46 CDPA 1988, ss. 90, 222, Trade Marks Act 1994, s. 22. According to Patents Act 1977, s. 30(1), 
patents are not choses in action, but nobody knows why not, see William Cornish, David Llewelyn, 
Tanya Aplin, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights, 8th ed 
(London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2013), 292, n. 66. 
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upon assignments of claims (‘debts’). 47  The assignment of a (contractual) claim 
emphasises its proprietary quality: especially in English law, where the numerus 
clausus of property rights de facto exists,48 but is not as rigid as in codified civil law 
systems, a hallmark of what defines property is its transferability, despite the inherent 
circularity of this argument (it is property, therefore transferable – it is transferable, 
therefore property).49 There is no doubt that a claim (such as a monetary claim or a 
claim directed at delivery) is part of a person’s assets (‘property’ in the meaning of 
(a)). This wide understanding of property is only an application of the general idea of 
property in English law.  Ius commune-based civil law systems of the European 
continent also have a wide meaning of ‘property’, for example France,50 or Austria,51 
but not Germany.52 Where does that leave the well-established distinction between 
rights in rem and rights in personam? The debt or the corresponding claim are only 
binding and enforceable by the contracting parties, but the obligation as such goes 
beyond the purely personal relationship of the parties to the obligation. The obligation 
is a (proprietary) asset, and it is protected by tort law, particularly the tort of 
knowingly procuring (inducing) a breach of contract53 that is directed against third 
parties, similar to a property right which is – in England54 – protected through torts as 
well.55  The intangible claims and debts within the obligations share this tortious 
protection with other pure intangible property rights or legal concepts: intellectual 
property rights. Their infringement provisions are functionally special torts.56 The 
obligation out of which claims and debts arise as jura in personam is itself a res. The 
term of English law, chose in action, is an expression of this concept. Intellectual 
property rights are also choses in action, and when it comes to the transfer of 
intellectual property rights, even civil law systems resort to an analogous application 
of the rules on assignments of claims (‘debts’).57 
                                                 
47 E.g. Germany, § 413 BGB, but this rule is usually replaced by special provisions. 
48  Bernard Rudden, Economic Theory v. Property Law: The Numerus Clausus Problem, in John 
Eekelaar and John Bell (eds), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence. Third Series (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), 244, for English law. 
49 National Provincial Bank v. Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175, 1247G-1248A, per Lord Wilberforce. 
50 Art. 529 Code Civil. 
51 § 285 Austrian ABGB. 
52 § 90 German BGB. 
53 Lumley v. Gye (1853) 1 Bl. & Bl. 216, and Bowen v. Hall (1881) 6 QBD 333. 
54 The Roman law-based systems have the rei vindicatio instead for the protection of the ownership 
right, but for tangible property only, see Rahmatian, Intellectual Property, 374-375. 
55 Trespass and conversion in particular for personal property, see Bridge, 79. These property torts give 
stronger protection than the torts protecting against interference with a contract since these require 
knowledge and intent, see William V H Rogers, Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort, 16th ed (London: Sweet 
and Maxwell, 2002) 628, and OBG Ltd. v. Allan [2008] 1 AC 1, paras. 308-10. 
56  Andreas Rahmatian, Contracts infringing Intellectual Property Rights, 4 Intellectual Property 
Quarterly (2003), 426-427. 
57 For example in Austria, Fritz Schönherr, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht. Grundriß 
Allgemeiner Teil (Wien: Manz, 1982), 22-23. Germany has an explicit rule: § 413 BGB, but only if 
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Thus the assignment emphasises that the obligation is a res (in English law: 
assignment of a chose in action58). Legal systems often require a notification or even 
consent of the debtor to make the assignment effective against third parties.59 Since 
there is not necessarily a physical social reifier that represents the res and its change 
of allocation or entitlement,60 the central party to perform the obligation, the debtor, 
must acknowledge the assignment to effect the transfer of entitlement from the old to 
the new creditor vis-à-vis third parties. To ensure transferability or fungibility of 
claims (monetary or otherwise), documentary intangibles61 like the bill of exchange 
and the promissory note,62 provide a corporeal social reifier of the abstract underlying 
res. That is particularly important, where, as is with some documentary intangibles, 
there is an exception to the nemo dat quod non habet rule.63 Not only the physicality 
of the paper, but also the strict formality requirements64 represent the res, the exact 
claim and its limits, to make it recognisable and enforceable against third parties, 
similar to the description and claims of a patent. The most important documentary 
intangibles, the bill of exchange, the cheque as a special bill of exchange,65 and the 
promissory note, akin to the bill of exchange or even a form of it in particular cases,66 
are all physical reifiers of the res, here necessarily a monetary claim.67 So is the 
banknote: it started life as a promissory note of a bank to pay a sum of gold payable to 
bearer on demand.68 
 
c) Money Reified by Banknotes 
The banknote is technically still a promissory note payable on demand69 and one, not 
the only, social reifier of ‘money’, more precisely of cash. The bank note retains its 
quality as a promissory note whether or not this is spelt out on the note (as in England 
and Scotland) or whether or not a gold standard is still in place.70 Historically the 
                                                                                                                                           
there are no special provisions (e.g. § 15 German Patent Act 1980, § 27 German Trade Marks Act 
1994). 
58  In equity, to which assignment was confined historically, see Guenter H Treitel, The Law of 
Contract, 11th ed (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2003), 674-675. 
59 England: LPA 1925, s. 136(1); Scotland: intimation of assignation; Germany: § 409 BGB; Austria: 
§ 1396 ABGB; France: Art. 1690 Code Civil, and Savatier, 323.  
60 But there can be one, ordered by statute, see LPA 1925, s. 136(1) for statutory assignment and the 
social reifier effected by formality rules: absolute assignment by writing under the hand of the assignor. 
61  Bridge, 19. For the equivalent in Germany, see Wolfgang Zöllner, Wertpapierrecht, 14th ed 
(München: C H Beck, 1987), 27-28, 32-34. 
62 BoEA 1882, ss. 3, 83. 
63 BoEA 1882, s. 29. 
64 BoEA 1882, s. 3(2). For Germany, see Zöllner, 65. 
65 BoEA 1882, s. 73. 
66 BoEA 1882, s. 5 (2). 
67 ‘A sum certain in money’, BoEA 1882, s. 3(1), s. 83(1). 
68 McKendrick, 489 note 7. 
69 See BoEA 1882, s. 89, Procter (2012: 45), Banco de Portugal v. Waterloo & Sons [1932] AC 452, 
HL, at 478, 487. 
70 Banco de Portugal v. Waterloo & Sons [1932] AC 452, HL, at 477, 487, 509. 
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promise was for payment of the equivalent of the face value in gold, since the 
abolition of the gold standard (in the UK finally in 193171) the promise is directed at a 
more general debt.  
Money is an obligation or, from a debtor’s perspective, a form of debt. Why 
and against whom money is a debt, will become clear after an examination of the 
money supply process. 72  In the case of cash, the res or money-obligation is 
represented physically by banknotes and coins. In the case of bank money, the res is 
represented by the accounting entries in the ledgers or computers of the bank. The res 
is the obligation which money is, and it can be used to extinguish a different monetary 
debt arising, for example, from a contract of sale. Unlike the money obligation-res, 
the res of the obligation and monetary debt from the contract of sale may not have a 
social reifier at all. This must obviously be distinguished from the property-objects 
which are the subject-matter of the sale and to which real rights (specifically 
ownership) are attached that constitute the res which are themselves represented by 
the physical things, for instance, ‘goods’.73 Furthermore, one needs to separate the 
money obligation-res represented by the banknote from the personal property-res 
(chattel) as represented by the banknote as well since the banknote is itself a chattel 
and can just be commodity or curio in exceptional cases.74 (One feels reminded of the 
physical copy of a book representing the personal property-res and the copyright-res 
at the same time.) 
The rare scenario in Banco de Portugal v. Waterloo & Sons75 shows how this 
principle works in practice. In that case the Bank of Portugal ordered and was 
delivered 600,000 banknotes (500 escudo notes) by a British printer, and the Bank of 
Portugal put them into circulation. Then 500,000 notes were ordered from the printer 
by a rogue posing successfully as having been authorised by the Bank of Portugal and 
were delivered by the printer in breach of contract. These unauthorised notes were 
also put into circulation, and the Bank of Portugal was forced to withdraw the whole 
issue of these banknotes. The question was whether damages claimed were only in 
relation to the printing costs of the banknotes, or whether damages were, in addition, 
the exchange value in sterling of the Portuguese currency given in exchange for the 
unauthorised notes. The HL (by a 3:2 majority) decided in favour of the latter. The 
banknotes, authorised or not (they came from the same printer and were not actual 
                                                 
71 Through the Gold Standard Amendment Act 1931, s. 1, see Mann, 31, Geoffrey Crowther, An 
Outline of Money (London: Nelson, 1946), 62, 319. 
72 This is discussed below under 3. 
73 See definition of goods under the Sale of Goods Act 1979, s. 61(1). 
74 Moss v. Hancock [1988] 2 QB 117 (in this case a coin). 
75 Banco de Portugal v. Waterloo & Sons [1932] AC 452, HL. 
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forgeries) have no legal effect as promissory notes before they are issued,76 and if 
destroyed before, the liability for damages would be for the cost of paper and printing 
of the notes. After issue, the bank undertakes an obligation in relation to the notes in 
circulation which is denoted by the face value of the notes, here within a paper 
currency. The latter amount is the proper measure of damages (together with the 
printing costs).77 One could also say, in the terminology of dematerialised property, 
the mere printed paper represents the personal property-res (damages for its 
destruction), while the face value on the banknote represents the debt/money-res 
(damages for lost currency value of the note). 
Similar cases highlight the difference within the social signifier that represents 
the personal property-res as well as the res of money-as-obligation. A situation is 
where a banknote has been stolen and the distinction has to be made whether 
ownership transfer is possible: in relation to the tangible personal property of the 
paper the nemo dat rule would normally apply, in relation to the banknote 
representing the money obligation-res the exception to the nemo dat rule applies 
instead and the bearer is entitled, so as to preserve full negotiability and fungibility of 
paper money. The exception to the nemo dat rule of the money obligation78 prevails 
over the general principle of nemo dat in relation to the physical paper.79 Another 
situation is where a banknote or a coin could be put into circulation and transferred as 
currency but is in fact transferred as curio or commodity, such as a rare coin or a 
historical banknote. In such a case there is no question of fungibility and no exception 
of the nemo dat rule for money because the object did not operate as money; rather, 
there is only the personal property-res element (represented by the physical paper or 
metal object). The general rules of personal property transfer apply, so that the person 
from whom the coin/note has been stolen can request their restitution as specific 
objects. These physical objects to be restored are the social reifiers of the res as medal 
or curio, not as money-obligation.80 If a (bearer) bill of exchange or cheque is said to 
be currency or as good as cash, this means that for practical purposes one res 
(contractual debt directed at money) is equated with another res (the money-
obligation itself): legally this equalisation is imprecise and normally incorrect.81 
                                                 
76 This is the general rule for promissory notes and bills of exchange: bills of exchange have legal 
effect only if delivered (handed over) to the payee, see BoEA 1882, ss. 21, 84. 
77 Banco de Portugal v. Waterloo & Sons [1932] AC 452, HL, at 478, 483, 510. 
78 The reason that a bearer in good faith and for value obtains good title even if the transferor has a 
defective title is not that money has no ear-mark, but that the physical object operating as money is 
currency, not commodity, see Moss v. Hancock [1899] 2 QB 111, at 115-116.  
79 Miller v. Race (1758) 2 Kenyon 189 (see also 1 Burr 453), 96 ER 1151, at 1154. Lord Mansfield 
says (at p. 1154) that banknotes ‘become the same as cash.’ In a modern system of money, banknotes 
are cash because the promise to exchange to gold at face value is meaningless.  
80 Moss v. Hancock [1899] 2 QB 111, at 116. 
81 Banque Belge pour l’Étranger v. Hambrouck [1921] 1 KB 321, at 323, 326. 
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d) Bank Money and Definitions of Money 
The discussion so far has focused on the property aspect of money if it is cash and its 
representation in form of banknotes and coins. For bank money the representation is 
only in relation to the money-obligation res, without any further personal property 
element: the money-res is represented by the accounting entries.82 Since the lawyers’ 
main concern is the transfer of, and entitlement to, money, legal definitions of money 
tend to be pragmatic and incorporate the usual economic definition of money. Money 
in law is generally defined with reference to Moss v. Hancock.83 The characteristics of 
money is that it is fully negotiable and, unlike commodities, has no purpose beyond 
payment or discharging debts. Another decision stresses the social acceptance of 
money: ‘Money, properly speaking, is whatever common consent has fixed upon as a 
sign denoting a certain value’. 84  This opinion moves towards an economist’s 
understanding of money, for whom money is usually defined as any asset that can 
easily be used to purchase goods and services. It fulfils three roles: being a medium of 
exchange, a store of value, and a unit of account 85  (the numéraire according to 
Walras86). Lawyers accept this view,87 sometimes with some minor additions,88 and 
often with emphasis on the role as medium of exchange,89 which mirrors the legal 
model of the sales contract as the principal concept of transactions. Apart from the 
fact that economists tend to take the functions of money for the meaning of money,90 
the definition is not quite complete for the lawyer, especially with regard to the store 
of value function.91 Banking business distinguishes between narrow money (M1) and 
broad money (M2-4).92 The US Federal Reserve and other central banks use the 
                                                 
82 Savatier, 216-217. 
83 Moss v. Hancock [1899] 2 QB 111, at 116: Money is ‘that which passes freely from hand to hand 
throughout the community in final discharge of debts and full payment for commodities, being 
accepted equally without reference to the character or the person who offers it and without the intention 
of the person who receives it to consume it or apply it to any other use than in turn to tender it to others 
in discharge of debts or payment for commodities.’ 
84 Miller v. Race (1758) 2 Kenyon 189 (also 1 Burr 453), 96 ER 1151, at 1154 per Lord Mansfield. 
85 Crowther, 15-16; Paul Krugman, Robin Wells, Economics, 4th ed (New York: Worth Publishers, 
2015), 854-856, Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics, 6th ed (International Edition) (Mason, 
O./London: Cengage Learning, 2012), 621. 
86 Léon Walras, Théorie de la monnaie (extrait de la revue scientifique, numéros des 10 et 17 avril 
1886), (Bureau des revues, 1886), 12, 15. 
87 McKendrick, 488, Mann, 22-23. 
88 Proctor, 10-12, who adds ‘a measure of value or … a standard for contractual obligations’ (at p. 10). 
89 Mann, 5, 22. 
90 Krugman and Wells, 854: ‘Money is defined in terms of what it does.’ 
91 See briefly in the conclusion below. 
92 Peter Howells, Keith Bain, The Economics of Money, Banking and Finance, 3rd ed (Harlow: Pearson, 
2005), 231. 
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aggregates of M1 and M2 to measure the overall money supply; 93  the Bank of 
England categorises M1 money as currency, bank deposits and central bank 
reserves.94 For present purposes, ‘money’ is certainly M1, but can also be M2: this is 
less relevant for the legal concept of dematerialised property and the res that money 
is, because this notional dematerialisation in law is also a conceptual monetisation of 
all assets, whether being money in the narrow sense or not.  
Commodity money 95  (with an intrinsic value), and commodity-backed 
money96 (by reference to an intrinsic value)97 are historical forms of money today.98 
The current system is that of fiat money, that is, being established by order of law as 
money without any intrinsic value and without any commodity-backing,99 not just 
accepted and used as money or means of payment in certain communities, based on a 
social convention.100 The law orders that banknotes and coins without any intrinsic 
value have to be accepted as satisfaction of debts and thus declares them as legal 
tender 101  or compulsory tender. Thus an object with no intrinsic value must be 
accepted by law as full and complete payment, not in lieu of payment (such as 
payment by cheque102), but as payment proper, and is inconvertible or irredeemable 
(e.g. in form of gold). This concept is not specific to a particular jurisdiction.103 Coins 
were always legal tender, banknotes of the Bank of England were finally declared 
legal tender in England since 1833.104 Before, banknotes were money, but not legal 
tender.105 Banknotes issued by Scottish banks are not legal tender, either in England 
in Scotland.106 It appears that Scottish banknotes were classical promissory notes of 
                                                 
93 The exact definitions of M1, M2, M3, M4 depend on the country. For the USA, see Krugman and 
Wells, 857-858; Mankiw, 624-625. For the European Central Bank see the Bank of England website: 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/Pages/iadb/notesiadb/m3.aspx (visited 19 November 2016). 
See also Deutsche Bundesbank, Geld und Geldpolitik, ch. 3: Das Buchgeld (2015), 69-74. 
94 Bank of England, Money in the Modern Economy: An Introduction, Quarterly Bulletin Q1 (2014), 5-
8. Central bank money can also be referred to as M0. 
95 E.g. gold and silver coins, see Crowther, 18-23, for a short discussion of the history. 
96 Gold standard of a paper currency, in the UK until 1931 with interruptions. For the history of its 
collapse, see Crowther, 354-362. More tenuous backing through Bretton Woods system until 1971, see 
Mann, 34. 
97 Krugman and Wells, 856-857; Mankiw, 621-622. 
98 See Mann, 30-34, for the history. 
99 Krugman and Wells, 857, Mankiw, 622; Bank of England, Money in the Modern Economy, 5. 
100 That is more the economist’s interpretation of money, see e.g. Crowther, 36, Mankiw, 622. 
101 Mann, 41. The present legal basis for banknotes as legal tender in England is the Currency and Bank 
Notes Act 1954, c. 12, s. 1 (3), for coins as legal tender in the whole UK the Currency Act 1983, c. 9, s. 
1 (3) amending Coinage Act 1971, c. 24, s. 2. 
102 Payment by cheque has been referred to as payment in cash, for example in the Scottish case The 
Glasgow Pavilion v. William Motherwell (1903) 6 F 116, IH, at 119. 
103 E.g. for Germany § 14 Bundesbankgesetz 1992. 
104 Bank of England Act 1833, s. 6.  
105 Wright v. Reed (1790) 3 TR 554 (100 ER 729). Mann (n 9) 40-41. 
106 The Glasgow Pavilion v. William Motherwell (1903) 6 F 116, IH, at 119. Only coins issued by the 
Royal Mint are legal tender, see  Donald B Caskie, Wallace and McNeil’s Banking Law, 10th ed 
(Edinburgh: Green/Sweet and Maxwell, 1991), 18. See also Currency and Bank Notes Act 1954, c. 12, 
s. 1 (1) and (2). 
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the issuing Scottish banks until the Banking Act 2009 in the wake of the financial 
crisis.107 Bank money108 and electronic money (digitised cash)109 are money, but not 
(or not yet110) legal tender. 
 
e) The Money Obligation as a Normative Text 
It follows from the foregoing: When payment of a monetary debt arising from a 
contract of sale, for example, is made with money, the sales debts become discharged 
and thereby replaced by the money obligation (the money debt from a debtor’s 
perspective, now a different debtor), being the res, represented by physical refiers, 
such as banknotes and coins. Where the creditor has to accept by law this payment as 
satisfaction of his claim and full discharge of the debt, the money obligation 
represented by the refiers is legal tender. Payment can also be made by a different 
means which can be converted at any time into legal tender under the conditions of a 
healthy economy, for example payment through cheques or bank money111 transfers 
that can be converted into cash and are therefore usually ‘as good as cash’. In the case 
of bank money the res is represented by accounting entries only, thus essentially a 
text (and figures) with normative quality. Ultimately all money is a normative text112 
creating a debt and a legally enforceable expectation to obtain real value (e.g. tangible 
property) at a future time.113 
 
 
3 The Creation of Money 
 
Money itself is an obligation (a ‘debt’114) because of the money supply process which 
is really a money creation process. There is a dual system of money supply: money 
created by central banks and money created by commercial banks.  
                                                 
107 The Banking Act 2009 introduced in s. 217 the requirement that banknotes issued by the Scottish 
banks must now be backed by backing assets. 
108 In re Stonham. Lloyds Bank v Maynard [1963] 1 WLR 238 at 245: Money is also money on deposit 
at a bank, provided no substantial period of notice for paying out is required. Hence National Savings 
Certificates are not money, see In re Hodgson. Norwell v. Flannery [1936] 1 Ch 203, at 207, for want 
of the fungible quality of money. 
109 Proctor, 50. On the definition of electronic money, see EU-Directive 2000/46/EC on the taking up, 
pursuit of and prudential supervision of the business of electronic money institutions, Art. 1 (3)(b). 
110 See e.g. overview of limits for cash payments in the EU at: http://www.europa-consommateurs.eu 
(accessed 6 Dec 2016). 
111 The difference is that cheques are regarded as in lieu payments, while bank money is usually not. 
112 Andreas Rahmatian, Money as a Normative Text, 13(2) Journal of International Business and Law 
(2014), 228. 
113 This is an application of Jeremy Bentham’s idea of property in general, Bentham (n 37) 112: ‘The 
idea of property consists in an established expectation; in the persuasion of being able to draw such or 
such an advantage from the thing possessed … this persuasion can only be the work of law.’  
114 See also Bank of England, Money in the Modern Economy, 3: ‘Money in the modern economy is 
just a special form of IOU … a financial asset’, or, put differently, a res. 
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a) Money created by Central Banks 
Among a central bank’s purposes as the bank of the commercial banks and the 
government, and as the regulator of monetary policy and the lender of last resort,115 
its role as the issuer of banknotes is the most obvious to the general public. 116 
Relevant is here that a banknote represents a debt of the issuing central bank 
expressed by the face value. Since conversion into gold or any other commodity of 
value is no longer possible, the debt is self-referential, since the promise to pay is 
redeemed with further promises to pay. 117  In fact, the debt is never repaid but 
‘eternal’.118 As already said, payment of a debt arising from a contract of sale with 
banknotes (cash) is the replacement of the sale’s debt with a money obligation 
represented by the banknote, being legal tender, so the original debt is extinguished. 
Commercial banks keep accounts with the central bank: their cash holding consists of 
banknotes issued by the central bank and of their deposits with the central bank 
(‘central bank money’).119 When commercial banks need additional banknotes, for 
example to pay customers withdrawing from their accounts, or to pay out a loan 
granted, they reduce their credit balance with the central bank and increase their 
liability.120 The central bank can increase or reduce the quantity of money issued to 
the public. 121  The money supply can be regulated or, realistically, influenced 
somewhat through changing the quantity of reserves (purchase/sale of government 
bonds, lending of reserves to banks) or through changes of the reserve ratio of banks 
with the central bank. Historically, these forms of monetary control have been the 
central regulatory measures of the monetary system central banks have, and 
economics textbooks still stress this role of central banks.122  
 
                                                 
115 Walter Bagehot, Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market (London: Henry S King, 
1873), chapter VII, sections 44-75. 
116 Crowther, 58; Ross Cranston, Principles of Banking Law, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), 111. 
117 Crowther, 62-63. 
118 Hans Christoph Binswanger, The Growth Spiral (Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer, 2013), 40.  
119 Crowther, 59-60. 
120 Crowther, 47; Binswanger, 40 and note 3. There are further ways in which a bank can increase its 
cash holding. 
121 Crowther, 62. 
122 E.g. Mankiw, 632-635. 
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b) Money created by Commercial Banks 
 
(i) Credit creation theory of money 
However, the degree of a central bank’s influence must be weighed against the fact 
that most circulating money, well over 90%,123 is bank money created by commercial 
banks. This is the second and much more important method of creating money – by 
way of credit granted by commercial banks.124 Traditionally it has been assumed (and 
a large proportion of the general public may still hold that view) that commercial 
banks grant credits out of the deposits by their customers, the so-called financial 
intermediation theory of money.125 The Bank of England itself has recently laid to rest 
this idea,126 and the House of Commons has followed the Bank of England’s position 
in a debate devoted to money creation.127 Another view, the fractional reserve theory 
of money, is misleading because it claims that the central bank determines the 
quantity of loans and deposits in the economy by controlling the central bank money 
with the use of the ‘money-multiplier’.128  The Bank of England has rejected this 
theory as well as too inaccurate because this is not the proper way in which money is 
created. 129  However, economics textbooks still maintain the importance of the 
fractional reserve/money multiplier aspect in the money creation process, 130  and 
indeed, it plays a certain practical role in banking,131 although it is not essential to 
money creation as such.  
The proper description of money creation by commercial banks is the credit 
creation theory of money. It was described already in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries by authors like H. D. Macleod and J. A. Schumpeter,132 but it only 
obtained full recognition by the central banks in their publications after the time of the 
banking crisis of 2008.133 The probably unsettling aspect of the credit creation theory 
                                                 
123 Richard A Werner, How do Banks create Money, and why can other Firms not do the Same? An 
Explanation for the Coexistence of Lending and Deposit-taking, 36 International Review of Financial 
Analysis (2014) 72, says that 97% of the money supply in the UK is by credit creation by commercial 
banks. See also Bank of England, Money Creation in the Modern Economy, Quarterly Bulletin Q1 
(2014) 2. 
124 Binswanger, 38; Bank of England, Money Creation in the Modern Economy, 2. 
125 See Richard A Werner, Can Banks individually create Money out of Nothing? – The Theories and 
the empirical Evidence, 36 International Review of Financial Analysis (2014) 9, for a literature review. 
126 Bank of England, Money Creation in the Modern Economy, 2. 
127 Hansard, House of Commons, HC 20 November 2014, col 434. 
128 Discussed further below under section (iv). 
129 Bank of England, Money Creation in the Modern Economy, 2. For a literature review concerning the 
fractional reserve theory, starting with Alfred Marshall, see Werner, Can Banks individually create 
Money out of Nothing?, 6. 
130 E.g. Krugman and Wells, 866-869. 
131 See Crowther, 45. 
132 A Mitchell Innes, The Credit Theory of Money, 31 Banking Law Journal (1914), 159 (on MacLeod); 
Werner, Can Banks individually create Money out of Nothing?, 3-6. 
133 Bank of England, Money Creation in the Modern Economy, 2-4; Deutsche Bundesbank, Geld und 
Geldpolitik, ch. 4: Die Banken als Geldproduzenten, (2008) 60-63. 
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is that it confirms that banks create money out of nothing. The credit theory of money 
says that a sale/purchase is the exchange of a commodity for a credit,134 or, as said 
before, the exchange of a personal property-res as represented by the commodity as 
social refier, for a money obligation-res as represented, for example, by a banknote, 
or by an accounting entry if payment is with bank money. The credit creation theory 
of money says that banks create money by granting credit, that is, making a loan. This 
theory is the only one that is consistent with existing case law, especially Foley v. 
Hill,135 and can be explained briefly for present purposes as follows. When a bank 
makes a loan, it credits the customer’s account with the loan amount, which also 
means that the bank indebts itself: the customer-borrower is creditor and the banker-
lender is debtor when the bank deposits the loan amount in an account of the 
customer. Under the general rule, if a normal deposit is made in cash, the banker 
becomes owner of the banknotes and the customer’s debtor while the customer 
becomes unsecured creditor of the bank for the amount deposited.136  If the bank 
makes the loan this is its debt and a claim of the customer (borrower), credited to his 
account. Thus the bank granting the loan simultaneously creates a matching deposit in 
the borrower’s (customer’s) bank account. It is this moment in the accounting process 
which creates the money.137 The customer will use the credit to pay a third party to 
extinguish their claim. But the customer-borrower is at the same time obviously 
debtor of the amount lent: the bank credits itself with the amount of the loan the 
customer owes (on the assets side of the bank’s balance sheet) and at the same time 
debits itself with the loan amount as deposit of the customer owed to him by the bank 
(on the liabilities side of the bank’s balance sheet), because the loan money has been 
paid into the customer’s account. Thus banks grant credit by indebting themselves, 
and the borrower pays his debts with the debts of the bank.138 The credit money does 
not come from existing customers’ deposits.139 Since the bank’s liability to extend the 
credit is matched by a deposit in the borrower’s bank account, this is only a 
lengthening of the bank’s balance sheet,140  that is, the increase of the assets and 
liabilities of a balance sheet by the same amount.  
                                                 
134 Innes, 152. 
135 Foley v. Hill (1848) 2 HLC 28. See also Joachimson v. Swiss Bank Corporation [1921] 3 KB 110. 
136 Foley v. Hill (1848) 2 HLC 28, at 36-37. 
137 Bank of England, Money Creation in the Modern Economy, 1, 3. 
138 See Bank of England, Money Creation in the Modern Economy, 3; Deutsche Bundesbank, Geld und 
Geldpolitik, ch. 3: Das Buchgeld (2015), 76-80; Crowther, 43-45; Binswanger, 39-40; Howells and 
Bain, 235-239; Werner, How do Banks create Money, and why can other Firms not do the Same?, 71-
72. 
139 A relatively early clear statement in: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Modern Money Mechanics 
(1994), 6: ‘[Banks] do not really pay out loans from the money they receive as deposits. If they did 
this, no additional money would be created.’ 
140 Werner, How do Banks create Money, and why can other Firms not do the Same?, 72. 
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This balance sheet extension distinguishes banks from other companies or 
non-financial institutions when they grant loans. If a normal company grants a loan 
and transfers money to the borrower, that reduces the lender’s deposit (cash) assets 
and increases the claim assets resulting from the loan, because the funds granted must 
come from some other funds within the company. Overall, the total size of the 
company’s balance sheet does not change, because the increase of the claim is 
matched by a decrease of the funds out of which the lent money is paid. If a bank 
grants a loan, the size of the balance sheet is lengthened because the assets side (claim 
being the borrower’s liability to repay the loan) is matched by the liability side 
(customer deposit, borrower’s claim/bank’s liability being the amount of the loan 
granted), and there is no balance drawn down when the loan is paid (in bank money) 
to the borrower. The accounts also show that the bank never actually pays out the loan 
but still owes the money because no actual transfer of funds from anywhere within the 
bank to the customer has occurred. The bank rather re-classifies its liabilities when it 
‘pays out’ the loan: the bank’s ‘accounts payable’ obligation (the bank’s liability to 
the borrower to pay out the loan because of the loan agreement) is reduced by the loan 
amount and at the same time re-classified as ‘customer deposit’ of the borrower with 
the bank, although neither the customer-borrower nor the bank deposited any funds.141 
This new ‘customer deposit’ is the new money created through credit, and it is 
money according to the understanding of money in banking practice:142 it is a new 
money-obligation or res. Since a res is an abstract legal notion according to the 
concept of dematerialised property, there is no need for an already existing res, 
perhaps represented by a physical reifier. A money obligation-res can be created out 
of nothing like any other obligation or like a work of copyright. The new deposit (a 
re-labelled bank liability) arises out of nothing because no funds coming from within 
the bank have actually been paid out. Since the bank has created a legally enforceable 
claim through the accounting entries for granting the loan, and since this claim can 
ultimately be transformed into physical assets in the enforcement process in case of 
non-repayment, the bank has itself created a real value (expectation value) as creditor 
by virtue of an act of writing. The accounting entries are therefore a normative text, 
similar to the text of a bill of exchange or cheque made out in accordance with the 
legal formality requirements. 143  The difference is that the drawer of the bill of 
exchange attaches his liability (the payee’s/indorsee’s/holder’s claim) inescapably to 
his own funds and assets which stand behind it, and the legal basis for this liability is 
clearly extant,144  while a bank’s loan claim and corresponding debt come out of 
                                                 
141 Werner, How do Banks create Money, and why can other Firms not do the Same?, 73-74. 
142 See Bank of England, Money in the Modern Economy: An Introduction, 7, 9. 
143 BoEA 1882, s. 3(2), s. 89(1). 
144 BoEA 1882, ss. 53-58. 
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nothing and are not attached to other funds of the bank, and the legal basis for the 
right of the bank to create such a claim is obscure.145 
Since the creation of money by credit out of nothing may appear 
unsatisfactory, attempts have been made to argue that a creation truly out of nothing 
does not really take place. The money the banker creates is his liability and he must 
provide for payment in cash when asked, and although the system is based on the 
assumption that only few at any one time will demand payment, the banker must 
ensure that his cash does not fall below a certain proportion of his deposit liabilities. 
Furthermore, the earning capacity of the borrower, the bank’s loan claim or a security 
are assets, and the acquisition of such assets brings about the deposit which just 
transforms other forms of less mobile wealth into liquid money. 146  What this 
argument overlooks is the fact that first the money-obligation res or asset is created, 
and only then corresponding assets, such as the borrower’s earning capacity or 
property as security may be attached, or, if cash payment must be made, the debt is 
replaced by central bank money, being another debt which is never repayable but 
eternal as a result of the fiat money system. The credit as an asset is not 
counterbalanced by the corresponding liability (hence the characteristic balance sheet 
extension), and so the liability cannot be posited as some value already in existence 
that could contradict the idea of a creation out of nothing.   
 
(ii) Exception from client money rules for banks 
The invented customer deposit, being the created money, is in substance 
indistinguishable from the ‘real’ deposits by customers. Any existing ‘real’ deposits 
are however irrelevant for the grant of loans, contrary to the financial intermediation 
theory of money. Non-banks cannot create money by way of giving credit, because 
their funds for the loan must come from own funds. Furthermore, as a necessary 
device for money creation, they do not normally hold customer deposits. This is 
unlike banks, where real deposits can be complemented by invented ones, that is, 
liabilities re-classified as customer deposits which are also debts from the bank’s 
perspective. If non-banks obtain customer/client money, they have to keep them in 
separate accounts as trustees, such as solicitor’s accounts, segregated from their own 
business accounts. 147  For example, the client money rules of the UK Financial 
Conduct Authority require client deposits to be held in segregated accounts with 
banks.148  
                                                 
145 See below under 4 and 5. 
146 Crowther, 44, 46-47. 
147 See the SRA Account Rules 2011 of the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA), Rules 13 et seq.: 
Client Accounts, e.g. Rules 13.2, 13.5, 14.1, 14.2, 18.2, 20.1. 
148 FCA Handbook CASS 7.13.3 ‘Client Money Rules: Segregation of Client Money’ (version: release 
11, Nov. 2016), see www.handbook.fca.org.uk (visited 14 November 2016). 
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Banks are expressly exempt from this requirement. The following is not client 
money: any deposit within the meaning of the CRD held by a CRD credit 
institution,149 and: ‘The money held for that client is held by the firm as banker and 
not as a trustee under the client money rules’.150 This exception mirrors the general 
rule in Foley v. Hill that a banker taking deposits does not hold the money as a trustee 
of the customer but only assumes a liability as an ordinary party (debtor) to the 
contract with the customer.151 It is, however, this exception from the normal client 
money rules which enables banks to create money through credit by mixing different 
liabilities.152 This reflects the economic concept of a bank as a reservoir of money.153 
The courts recognise that deposited funds are not specifically segregated, but 
commingled with the bank’s other funds.154  That method of money creation also 
enables banks to shore up their finances by simply finding new borrowers to whom 
they grant loans and thereby increase their capital. 155  In the same way possible 
obligations to pay fines from regulators can be met, or compliance with capital 
adequacy rules can be achieved. 
 
(iii) The interpretation of client money protection by the UK Supreme Court in 
the Lehman Brothers liquidation case in contrast to banks 
The UK Supreme Court decision of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) v. CRC 
Credit Fund Ltd156 illustrates well the difference between a normal institution taking 
client money with a duty to keep that money segregated and a bank which is exempt 
from this requirement, since the money paid to the bank is not defined as client 
money and not held in trust. Although the insolvent firm in question, Lehman 
Brothers International (Europe) (‘LBIE’), was a trading subsidiary in the UK of the 
US holding company as part of the (then also insolvent) Lehman Brothers investment 
bank group, this firm did not operate as a bank. It was authorised by the Financial 
                                                 
149  A full CRD credit institution is, for present purposes, a bank authorised under relevant EU 
regulations (abbreviated as CRD). 
150 FCA Handbook CASS 7.10.16 and 7.10.19 ‘Client Money Rules: Credit Institutions and Approved 
Banks’ (version: release 11, Nov. 2016). 
151 Foley v. Hill (1848) 2 HLC 28, at 43-44; Ellinger, 120-122. 
152 Werner, How do Banks create Money, and why can other Firms not do the Same?, 74-75. 
153 Ellinger, 215. 
154 Azam v. Iqbal [2007] EWHC 2025 (Admin), [2008] BusLR 168, paras. 15-17, 27-29, and Foley v. 
Hill (1848) 2 HLC 28, at 36: ‘The money paid into the banker’s, is money known by the principal to be 
placed there for the purpose of being under the control of the banker; it is then the banker’s money; he 
is known to deal with it as his own’: hence a segregation of accounts makes no sense. Accordingly, the 
money paid into the account cannot be traced (tracing as the equitable remedy in rem for breach of 
trust) and the customer is unsecured creditor, see Sinclair v. Brougham [1914] AC 398, at 419. See also 
Ellinger, 120.  
155 Example by Werner, How do Banks create Money, and why can other Firms not do the Same?, 76. 
156 In the matter of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) v. CRC Credit Fund Ltd. [2012] UKSC 6, 
also reported as: Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in administration) v. CRC Credit Fund Ltd. 
and others (Financial Services Authority intervening) [2012] Bus LR 667. 
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Services Authority (FSA), as it then was, to take and handle client money, but not to 
keep deposits.157 The firm was therefore subject to client money rules under Chapter 7 
of the Client Assets Sourcebook (‘CASS 7’), issued by the FSA under s. 138 of the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and giving effect to the EU Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directives (MiFiD).158 The CASS 7 rules required LBIE to 
segregate the client money and to keep it in separate accounts. Since under normal 
English trust law the segregation of clients’ money alone is not sufficient to establish 
a proprietary (equitable) interest in the clients’ funds 159  because the necessary 
declaration of trust is usually lacking (no certainty of intention), and a declaration of 
trust without segregation is not sufficient either (no certainty of subject-matter),160 
CASS 7 created a statutory trust which did not have to be interpreted according to the 
criteria of ordinary trust law.161  
Lord Hope discussed briefly the Scottish equivalent of the English statutory 
trust solution, given that Scots law, as in Civil Law jurisdictions, does not have an 
English-style trust with its division into common law and equitable ownership. The 
‘trustee’ in Scotland is an agent and fiduciary of the client and therefore the client’s 
money is held by the agent (‘trustee’) on his client’s behalf, so that in case of the 
agent’s/trustee’s insolvency, the client money still belongs to the client and does not 
form part of the agent’s insolvent estate.162 Similar solutions that seek to emulate the 
English statutory client money trust without taking over the division of ownership (as 
that would stand against the idea of the property concept of dominium in Roman law) 
can be found in European jurisdictions. In France, the corresponding device would be 
the fiducie, whereby the client enjoys proprietary protection of his client money as a 
bénéficiare, which resembles much the equitable ownership of an English beneficiary 
                                                 
157 Lehman Brothers v. CRC Credit Fund, para. 24. 
158 Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on Markets 
in Financial Instruments (OJ 2004 L145, p. 1) and the Commission Directive 2006/73/EC of 10 August 
2006 implementing Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards 
organisations requirements and operating conditions for investment firms and defined terms for the 
purposes of that Directive (OJ 2006 L241, p. 26). On the implementation of these Directives in Civil 
law jurisdictions who do not have the division into legal and equitable ownership under English trust 
law, see Dorothy Gruyaert and Sander van Loock, UK Supreme Court Decision on Lehman Brothers 
Client Money: Equity or Lottery?, 22(2) European Review of Private Law (2014), 225. 
159 This is the basis for the protection of clients’ (investors’) funds from the firm’s creditors in case of 
the firm’s insolvency, because equitable ownership ensures that the clients do not part with ownership 
and the clients’ funds do not become part of the insolvent firm’s assets, and that equitable ownership 
can only be effected with a trust. 
160 Lehman Brothers v. CRC Credit Fund, para. 186. 
161 Lehman Brothers v. CRC Credit Fund, para. 110. Especially the distribution rules of the trust 
(client) money under the trust do not follow general trust law, but the CASS 7 rules, Lehman Brothers 
v. CRC Credit Fund, para. 121. 
162 Lord Hope in Lehman Brothers v. CRC Credit Fund, paras. 2, 8, 10, 12. Lord Hope could have 
given a more ‘proprietary’ explanation for the Scottish trust as a fiducia, in that the agent-trustee holds 
a special patrimony for the client beside his personal general patrimony, but he did not go into too 
much detail.  
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in effect. German law considers the fiduciary relationship (Treuhand) as a contractual, 
though fiduciary, obligation of the owner to act in accordance with the fiduciary 
obligations to the client-beneficiary in relation to the client money. Although the 
client has only got a contractual, not proprietary, claim, in insolvency proceedings of 
the owner the client-beneficiary can require the separation of his client money from 
the insolvent estate of the owner under the fiduciary duty.163 Despite these different 
legal solutions, the result – the protection of the segregated client money in case of 
the trustee’s insolvency – is the same.  
In Lehman Brothers, all five judges of the Supreme Court were of the opinion 
that the statutory trust arises when the client’s money is received.164 But it was a 3:2 
decision on the following issue. Under the CASS 7 rules, LBIE had the option to pay 
incoming client money into a segregated client account on the day or the next 
business day (normal approach to money segregation requirements), or, as LBIE was 
a multi-product, multi-currency firm, it could instead pay incoming client money into 
the firm’s own account with the duty to segregate client money in a client bank 
account on a daily basis after a reconciliation of records and accounts of the 
entitlement of each client for whom the firm holds client money with the firm’s 
existing client accounts (alternative approach). 165  LBIE opted for the alternative 
approach, that is, LBIE paid client money into and out of its own accounts, but failed 
on a massive scale to identify and segregate client money according to the alternative 
approach rules.166  When LBIE became insolvent and therefore when the primary 
pooling event in relation to client money under the CASS 7 rules occurred, the 
question arose whether the primary pooling arrangements also apply to client money 
held in non-segregated accounts. The Supreme Court had to decide further whether 
participation in the client money pool depends on whether actual segregation of client 
money has taken place (contributions theory) or not but ought to have taken place 
(claims theory).167  
The majority in the Supreme Court168 decided in favour of the claims theory, 
thus the primary pooling arrangements also apply to client money in LBIE’s own 
accounts. The pooling at the primary pooling event includes any non-segregated client 
money in any account of the LBIE into which client money has been received.169 An 
interpretation of the wording of the CASS 7 rules does not confine the client money 
                                                 
163 Gruyaert and van Loock, 230-233. 
164 Lehman Brothers v. CRC Credit Fund, paras. 15, 62, 111, 128, 171. 
165 The rules are set out in detail in Lehman Brothers v. CRC Credit Fund, para. 39. 
166 Lehman Brothers v. CRC Credit Fund, para. 27. 
167 Lehman Brothers v. CRC Credit Fund, para. 139. 
168 Lord Clarke of Stone-Cum-Ebony, Lord Dyson, Lord Collins of Mapesbury. 
169 The non-segregation happened in breach of the client money rules in CASS 7, Lehman Brothers v. 
CRC Credit Fund, paras. 27, 80-81. 
 22 
pooling and distribution arrangements to actually segregated client money in separate 
accounts. This wide interpretation is also in line with the rationale of the MiFiD to 
ensure investor protection.170 According to the minority view,171 however, only client 
money actually segregated in client accounts is entitled to participate in the client 
money pool (contributions theory), because a trust without segregation cannot really 
provide protection for the money supposedly held in trust. The effect of the majority 
opinion would be that those clients whose money was indeed segregated would have 
to share the risk with the unsegregated clients which reduces considerably the 
individual pro-rata share on distribution and ‘makes investment banking more of a 
lottery than even its fiercest critics have supposed’.172 To construe CASS 7 in the way 
of the majority view would have the effect of depriving the client of the protection 
which the rules were designed to achieve at the very moment when it is most 
needed.173 
Regardless of the position one takes on Lehman Brothers, in relation to money 
creation the difference between a financial services firm and a bank is apparent. LBIE 
was a financial services institution which could handle money, but not take deposits 
and therefore had to hold client money separately on trust, either through actual 
segregation in client accounts or through required segregation at a later stage. That 
makes the creation of money impossible, because a firm like LBIE is neither allowed 
to take deposits nor to grant loans as part of their business activities,174 but exactly 
that would be required to be able to re-classify one liability as a different type of 
liability (bank liabilities being paid-in loan money re-labelled as customer deposits). 
The obligation of a client money trust account would stand against that. The decision 
in Lehman Brothers, that the statutory trust arises on receipt of the client money, 
underlines that: ‘Where money is received from a client … it would be unnatural, and 
contrary to the primary purpose of client protection, for the money to cease to be the 
client’s property on receipt, and for it … to become his property again on 
segregation.’ (per Lord Walker).175 But that is the situation of a bank, because there is 
no trust for the benefit of the customer:176  the money received becomes outright 
property of the banker, and when money is paid out again the customer becomes 
owner. By law and implemented by the client money rules for financial institutions, a 
                                                 
170 Lehman Brothers v. CRC Credit Fund, paras. 109-110, 167-169, 171, 196. 
171 Lord Hope of Craigshead, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe. 
172 Lehman Brothers v. CRC Credit Fund, para. 85, per Lord Walker. 
173 Lehman Brothers v. CRC Credit Fund, para. 18, per Lord Hope. 
174 If a private loan is granted by a firm like LBIE, that loan must derive from its assets. For example, 
the cash amount lent is replaced by a corresponding claim against the loan debtor. 
175 Lehman Brothers v. CRC Credit Fund, para. 63. 
176 Foley v. Hill (1848) 2 HLC 28, at 43-44. 
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bank does not hold the money on trust that is paid in by the customer, so for a bank a 
Lehman Brothers scenario would not have arisen.  
From the perspective of the concept of dematerialised property the client 
money is the res (here a debt which is the money, but it could also be the res reified 
by a physical chattel). If the res (client money) has been segregated under the 
statutory trust according to the CASS 7 rules, it is trust property and the clients’ 
claims to the trust property are proprietary. If the client money-res has not been 
segregated, the claims to the client money are contractual, and for the minority view 
in Lehman Brothers, they are indeed. The majority opinion somehow changed the 
contractual claims concerning the non-segregated client money to proprietary claims 
on which the client protection in case of non-compliance of the firm with the rules 
was based.177 For present purposes that makes no difference: even if the majority 
view could be interpreted contrariwise as ‘contractualising’ the clients’ proprietary 
claim to the actually segregated client money and so as effectively dissolving the trust 
relationship, this does not resemble a bank, because a commercial bank’s privilege of 
reclassifying liabilities is still absent.  
 
(iv) Banks’ capital adequacy requirements and fractional reserve 
There are, however, a few limitations to the banks’ privileges. In connection with 
capital adequacy requirements, banks have certain restrictions as to the amount of 
money they can create. It is clear that banks create their deposits (through 
reclassification of the banks’ debt to pay out the loan granted as a new customer 
deposit, again a debt to the customer), and are not dependent on the real deposits as a 
result of customers having money paid into their accounts with the banks.178 Capital 
adequacy rules require that banks must hold a fraction of their total deposits with the 
central bank.179 If the required fraction of the deposits in reserve has to be 10%, a loan 
of 100 (i.e. money created by credit paid into an account) does not make available an 
amount of 100 for further loans that can be deposited with this or another bank, but 
only 90: that is, the reserve ratio is 10% or 1/10. These 90 allow the bank to lend for 
90-10%, another for 81-10% and so forth. Thus the total increase of bank deposits is 
100+90+81+72.9 … or, put differently, the money multiplier is 10, being the 
reciprocal of the reserve ratio of 1/10 in the present example.180 According to this 
fractional reserve theory of money, when banks hold a fraction of deposits in reserve, 
banks create money in that way, and central banks supposedly influence the amount 
                                                 
177 Gruyaert and van Loock, 249. 
178 Crowther, 50. 
179 Or they are kept by the bank as cash which is central bank money. 
180  Instructive example by Deutsche Bundesbank, Geld und Geldpolitik, ch. 4: Die Banken als 
Geldproduzenten (2008), 61. 
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of money created by changing the reserve ratio: the higher it is, the less banks can 
lend and the smaller the money multiplier, so that the money supply is decreased.181 
Economics textbooks still describe the process of money creation in this way,182 
although the fractional reserve theory of money on which this explanation is based is 
a misleading presentation of the actual functioning of the money supply system.183 
The Bank of England itself states that the fractional reserve theory is incorrect: 
‘Another common misconception is that the central bank determines the quantity of 
loans and deposits in the economy by controlling the quantity of central bank money 
– the so-called “money multiplier” approach.’ In reality, the reserves are not a binding 
constraint on lending, nor does the central bank fix the amount of reserves that are 
available. The banks’ individual lending decisions determine the amount of bank 
deposits, and the real constraint on money creation is by the monetary policy that the 
central bank adopts.184 
In fact the obligatory minimum reserve is often well below 10% and depends 
on the type of liability.185 The capital adequacy requirements of the Basel Accord 
(now Basel III186) have been criticised as ineffective because they are based on the 
inaccurate theory that banks are financial intermediaries, that is, banks lend out of 
their customers’ deposits. 187  These matters are, however, not relevant for this 
discussion of a legal theory of money. 
Another aspect that cannot be discussed here is the role that interest plays. An 
interest-free loan from a bank is legally possible but unrealistic. As a simple 
calculation of interest and compound interest,188 an investment of 100 over 10 years 
with 10% interest yields a sum of 259.37,189 thus interest increases exponentially. The 
                                                 
181 Mankiw, 629, 630, 634. 
182 Mankiw, 627-632; Krugman and Wells, 864-868. 
183 Werner, Can Banks individually create Money out of Nothing?, 6-9, with a critical literature review 
of representative texts. Also Howells and Bain, 235-244, criticise the money multiplier explanation for 
the creation and quantity of money as misleading. 
184 Bank of England, Money Creation in the Modern Economy, 2, 7. 
185 See, for the Eurozone within the European Union, Regulation (EC) 1745/2003 of the European 
Central Bank on the application of minimum reserves of 12 Sept. 2003 (ECB/2003/9) OJ L 250/10, 
Art. 4: reserve ratio 2%, but for deposits with agreed maturity over two years or redeemable at notice 
over two years it is 0%. The minimum reserves are to be held with the respective national central bank 
of each EU Member State according to Art. 6. See also European Central Bank: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/1002/1015/html/index.en.html (visited 19 November 2016). 
186 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more 
resilient banks and banking systems, pp. 55-56, Pt. 129, 131. 
187 Werner, How do Banks create Money, and why can other Firms not do the Same?, 76. 
188 According to the formula M = P×(1+i)n, whereby M is the final amount, P the principal sum, i is the 
interest rate per year and n the number of years.  
189 A principal sum of 100 invested for 10 years with 10% interest will be the final repayment sum of 
100×(1+0.1)10 = 259.37, thus an increase of almost 160%. The assumption is: compound interest once 
a year.  
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asset the gain represents is obviously another’s liability190 and has to be met with 
wealth deriving from somewhere else. Furthermore, if all repay their debts, this 
destroys the assets of their creditors, and there would not be any money either, being a 
form of debt.191 
 
 
 
4 Money in Law as a Form of Enforceable Debt: The Legal Basis for Money 
Creation and Enforcement 
 
The money creation process shows that money is made in form of a debt. But it is the 
enforceability of the debt in law, and the fact that law forces the recipient to accept 
the money-debt as full payment and discharge of another (contractual) debt, that 
enables money to fulfil its role as a medium of exchange and as a store of value, or 
more precisely, as a reasonable expectation192 to obtain genuine value (especially 
tangible property, such as food, clothes) in the future through exchange. This is 
particularly important where the expectation to obtain value is the result of a 
normative text, especially of figures in accounting entries, the representing refier of 
the res in case of bank money. Since everyone can draw up accounts which denote 
that the lender indebts himself by giving credit at the same time, but only commercial 
banks can create money in this way (that is, ‘out of nothing’ with no corresponding 
value), it must be the law which gives legal effect to such an endeavour and which 
privileges the banks to create money through credit.  
For cash and central bank money in general (including central bank resources) 
we have legal sources. There are the respective provisions for coins,193 bank notes194 
and the right of the Bank of England to issue banknotes,195 and legal rules ordering 
that cash be legal tender,196 with corresponding provisions in other jurisdictions.197 
                                                 
190 In case of loans, the calculation of the full amount to be repaid – loan sums plus interest payments – 
is much more difficult because beside the duration and interest rate, that depends on the type of the 
loan (repayment mortgage etc.) the amount, number or frequency of repayments, and other costs, 
which the individual loan agreement would stipulate. 
191 Bank of England, Money Creation in the Modern Economy, 3: ‘[T]aking out a new loan creates 
money, the repayment of bank loans destroys money.’ 
192 The term ‘purchasing power’ is too optimistic. It suggests a firm causal link between money and the 
acquisition of real value which can obviously not been taken for granted. 
193 Coinage Act 1971, ss. 3 and 4. 
194 Currency and Bank Notes Act 1954, s. 3: ‘“bank notes” means notes of the Bank of England 
payable to bearer on demand’.  
195 Bank Charter Act 1844, s. 1; Currency and Bank Notes Act 1954, s. 1 (1). On the power of the Bank 
of England to make rules in respect of banknotes issued by Scottish and Northern Irish banks, see 
Banking Act 2009, s. 216.  
196 Coinage Act 1971, s. 2; Currency and Bank Notes Act 1954, s. 1 (2) and (4). Suffel v. Bank of 
England (1882) 9 QBD 555, at 563.  
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The provisions make clear that banknotes are money because they embody a promise 
to pay that is never fulfilled. This means that a central bank discharges its own 
monetary obligations by delivering new obligations to pay.198 There are also rules 
regarding the duty of banks to maintain accounts with the Bank of England as the 
central bank for netting their inter-banking liabilities and for keeping minimum 
reserves.199  
For commercial bank money the legal basis becomes opaque. There are 
decided cases and regulations which presuppose the existence and recognition of bank 
money, otherwise the decisions and rules would not make sense. Particularly the 
central rule that depositing cash in a bank account is equivalent to money lent by the 
customer to a banker and that this does not make the banker a trustee and bailee of the 
cash,200 presupposes the legally accepted transformation of cash into bank money. 
Bank money, nowadays almost always in the form of digitised transfer,201 is not legal 
tender, but payment practices, for example with tax authorities or utility companies, 
where cash payment is discouraged or only giro transfer is allowed, elevates bank 
money practically to the status of legal tender, or, put differently, the notion of ‘legal 
tender’ becomes less and less important.202 The English courts have taken a pragmatic 
approach early on.203 Nevertheless, all these provisions regulate what one can do with 
bank money, but not how bank money has to come into existence. It seems that the 
creation of bank money through credit is an informally recognised banking practice 
whereby the legal recognition happens indirectly by ordering legal consequences 
which are based on the assumed and accepted creation of bank money as a debt. Or 
the informal legal recognition is simply based on lawyers’ insufficient appreciation of 
the bank money creation process. It can hardly be doubted that there is legal 
recognition for the creation of bank money by granting loans, because the accounting 
entries on a sheet of paper or in a computer of the bank unquestionably result in a 
                                                                                                                                           
197  In Germany, the equivalent provision on the issuing of banknotes and legal tender is § 14 
Bundesbankgesetz 1992 (BGBl. I, p. 1782), at EU-level Art 128 TFEU (ex-Art 106 TEC). See Art 128 
TFEU: ‘The banknotes issued by the European Central Bank and the national central banks shall be the 
only such notes to have the status of legal tender within the Union.’ 
198 Proctor, 30 note 129; Binswanger, 40. 
199 Bank of England Act 1998, ss. 6, 17(7) and sched. 2. 
200 Foley v. Hill (1848) 2 HLC 28; Joachimson v. Swiss Bank Corporation [1921] 3 KB 110, at 117-
118. 
201 This digitised transfer of bank money must be distinguished from electronic money as digitised 
cash. 
202 Proctor, 26. 
203 In re Harmony and Montague Tin and Copper Mining Company (Spargo’s Case) (1872-73) LR 8 
Ch App 407, CA, at 411-412: it would be ‘an absurd and unjustifiable result … that an exchange of 
cheques would not be payment in cash, or that an order upon a banker to transfer money from the 
account of a man to the account of a company would not be a payment in cash’, followed by The 
Glasgow Pavilion v. William Motherwell (1903) 6 F 116, IH, at 119-120: cheques equal payment in 
cash, a distinction between cheque payment and cash payment is unjustifiable. The cheque is of course 
drawn on an account in bank money which presupposes bank money as a lawful concept. 
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legally enforceable debt of the borrower vis-à-vis his lending bank, whereby the 
lending bank has created the loan by indebting itself, as described before.204 The legal 
enforcement of the debt arising from the loan finally leads to a forcible transfer of the 
borrower’s physical property, thus real value, in enforcement or insolvency 
proceedings. 205  It is actually at this point when the conceptual money-debt res 
changes into a res represented by a physical object of genuine value. 206  Since a 
particular accounting method (one that is only available to banks) creates a legally 
enforceable claim, the law enables the transformation of the expectation value of 
money into the real value of assets seized in enforcement in case of non-payment of 
the debt. 
 
 
5 German Law as an Example for Enforcement of Bank Money as Debt: 
Findings from an Interview 
 
When trying to find the legal basis for the creation of bank money through credit by 
commercial banks it is worthwhile looking at the laws in Germany. The tradition of 
the Rechtsstaat207 with its inherent principle of legal certainty208 and the experiences 
of the complete corruption of the constitutional and legal system in the Third Reich 
that the idea of the Rechtsstaat was supposed to safeguard has prompted the German 
legal order to provide meticulously detailed regulations in all areas of the law to give 
effect to the principle of a constitutionally completely accountable executive power, 
together with a complex system of specialist courts. And indeed, there is a rule 
dealing with the creation of bank money through credit by commercial banks. The 
surprising point is that this rule could be interpreted as a prohibition. 
The German Banking Act 1998 (Kreditwesengesetz 1998, KWG), provides in 
§ 3(1)(3) that the conduct of lending business or deposit business is prohibited if, by 
agreement or in accordance with normal business practice, it is impossible or made 
seriously difficult to dispose of the credit amount or of the deposits by way of 
withdrawal in cash.209 This prohibition goes back to a provision of the Banking Act 
                                                 
204 See above under 3. 
205 In England: Civil Procedure Rules, Part 70, Part 83 et seq.; Insolvency Act 1986, Second Part, ss. 
251A et seq. In Scotland: Bankruptcy and Diligence (Scotland) Act 2007, Parts 4-11, Bankruptcy 
(Scotland) Act 2016, ss. 78, 109. 
206 If the debtor repays the loan in cash, the bank money-res (from the bank’s perspective) is replaced 
by a central bank money-res: one debt is replaced by another debt of different origin. In that case the 
expectation value of money is not transformed into real value. The same effectively applies if the 
debtor transfers bank money from another account to repay his loan, only that (from the bank’s 
perspective) bank money (the loan deposit) is simply destroyed.  
207 Georg Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, 3rd ed (Berlin: O Häring, 1914), 248-249, 362, 613. 
208 Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (Wien: Österreichische Staatsdruckerei, 1992), 257, 314. 
209 § 3(1)(3) Kreditwesengesetz 1998 – Verbotene Geschäfte. 
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1961 210  and had a predecessor in a similar prohibition in a law of 1934, 211  not 
surprisingly, since the financial crash of 1929-31 was fresh in people’s memory.212 A 
violation of this rule renders the whole agreement void;213 in addition, it is a criminal 
offence.214 The idea of this prohibition of misuse of bank money or cashless payment 
is that banks can otherwise provide credit without having liquidity (cash) available as 
backing assets and can therefore disproportionately strongly influence, particularly 
increase, the quantity of money and consequently disturb the financial stability of a 
national economy. This was exactly the reason given for the introduction of the 
prohibition in § 3(3) of the Banking Act 1961;215  the corresponding provision in 
§ 3(1)(3) of the current Banking Act 1998 is identical. This rule shall also prevent the 
establishment of isolated exchange circles in the economy where the delivery of 
goods is only paid for with crediting an amount on an account as consideration which 
cannot be withdrawn and converted to cash. 216  A company or bank could then 
theoretically obtain infinite capacity to grant loans. Since deposits could not be 
readily withdrawn, a deposit guarantee would be doubtful. It is this latter concern 
which commentators regard as the principal point the prohibition is directed at, more 
than the danger to the general economy because of a potentially uncontrolled 
expansion of money through the unrestrained grant of bank credits.217 
This cautiously restrictive interpretation of the prohibition in § 3(1)(3) is 
revealing, because at first sight it appears that this provision has exactly the creation 
of bank money through credit in mind. As described before, when a bank makes a 
loan, it credits the customer’s account with the credit amount and thereby indebts 
itself because the bank has technically the obligation to pay out the loan money (in 
cash): instead it credits the customer’s amount with bank money, whereby at the same 
time the customer becomes debtor as he is borrower of the bank money lent. The 
                                                 
210 § 3 (3) Gesetz über das Kreditwesen of 10 July 1961 (BGBl. I, no. 149, p. 881). 
211 § 2 Gesetz gegen Missbrauch des bargeldlosen Zahlungsverkehrs of 3 July 1934 (RGBl. I, p. 593). 
The law of 1934 was a typical product of economically interventionist and posturing paternalist 
fascism, but also sought to suppress the emergence of complementary currencies. 
212 See Jörg Schäfer, Die zivilrechtliche Qualifizierung des Interbankenabkommens (Berlin: Duncker 
und Humblot, 1990), 21. 
213  Andreas Schwennicke, § 3 n. 20 in Andreas Schwennicke, Dirk Auerbach, Kreditwesengesetz 
(KWG). Kommentar (München: C H Beck, 2009), 220; Andreas Schäfer, § 3 n. 30 in Karl-Heinz Boos, 
Reinfrid Fischer, Hermann Schulte-Mattler, Kommentar zum Kreditwesengesetz, 5th ed (München: C H 
Beck, 2016), 228, both with further references. 
214 § 54 Kreditwesengesetz 1998 (fine or imprisonment for up to five years). The offenders would be 
the directors and other organs entitled to act on behalf of the company or bank. 
215 The relevant statement in the preparatory material for the draft Banking Act 1961 is quoted in 
Schäfer, § 3 n 20 in Boos, Fischer, Schulte-Mattler, 226, and at length in Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin), Merkblatt verbotene Geschäfte (15 Nov 2012), pt. 4. See 
www.bafin.de (visited 30 Nov. 2016). 
216 Schäfer, § 3 n 19 in Boos, Fischer, Schulte-Mattler, 226; Schwennicke, § 3 n 15 in Schwennicke and 
Auerbach, 218. 
217 This is at least what Schäfer, § 3 n 21 in Boos, Fischer, Schulte-Mattler, 226, maintains. 
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customer could theoretically withdraw the money lent from his account and so obtain 
cash, if the loan agreement allows this. If not, this appears to be an unacceptable 
exclusion or restriction of cash withdrawal of a credit amount or a deposit under 
§ 3(1)(3).  
Commentators regard the prohibition of § 3(1)(3) as applicable only if cash 
withdrawal is excluded altogether, either by agreement, or factually made difficult, 
for example because of disproportionately high withdrawal fees, but the exclusion of 
cash withdrawals in individual cases is arguably not covered.218 A German court has 
decided that if a bank does not generally exclude or inhibit cash withdrawals of its 
loans or deposits, it does not fall under § 3, even where the bank excludes frequently 
cash withdrawals from loan deposits in individual cases.219 There is also authority to 
the effect that if cash pay-out of a loan is not available, but only crediting to an 
account opened for the borrower instead from which giro transfers can be made, this 
is not a violation of § 3.220 The main justification for the court’s view was that ‘this 
practise corresponds to an ever-increasing need for cash-less transfer of money’ and 
the bank does not evade the monetary policy measures of the German central bank in 
this way.221 The court seems to have had the practicalities of business transactions in 
mind but apparently has not appreciated the conceptual basis of money creation. 
Capital investment business is not considered as being subject to § 3 either.222 
Credit agreements are often silent on the question of cash withdrawals since 
bank money and cash are generally considered as effectively equivalent. But if the 
customer can insist on a cash withdrawal of the loan amount (so that the prohibition 
of § 3(1)(3) is definitely avoided), 223  then even a fairly small number of credit 
customers will bring about the immediate melt-down of the banking system, because 
only an insignificant amount of the granted bank loans is backed by cash. In 
Germany, as in other countries, only cash is legal tender.224 What does it mean if the 
customer can exercise his right in law but almost never in fact for systemic reasons? 
For example, can a customer claim from an insurance company because the insured 
event has occurred, but only if not too many other customers in the same situation do 
the same? Thus the exercise of certain rights granted to all depends on the number of 
people availing themselves of this right at any one time: a legal rule which benefits all 
                                                 
218 Schäfer, § 3 n 23 in Boos, Fischer, Schulte-Mattler, 227; Schwennicke, § 3 n 17 in Schwennicke and 
Auerbach, 219. 
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but not everyone in a given concrete situation. It always applies in general but never 
in (all) individual cases, a legal version of Zeno’s paradox, and it reflects accurately 
the core of banking business. 
If the rule of § 3 does apply, then the violation of the prohibition theoretically 
vitiates the loan agreement, so the borrower need not repay the loan. Judicial 
interpretation has watered down this consequence considerably: the loan agreement as 
a whole would not be rendered void, only the prohibition of cash withdrawal would 
be, because the purpose of the prohibition is not to prevent bank loans.225 One needs 
to ask whether the cash withdrawal is not the most crucial part of the loan agreement, 
and whether the prohibition of § 3 is not exactly directed at preventing banks from 
inflating their credit capacity by avoiding to honour their cash obligations in – all? – 
individual cases of loan deposits. By creating bank money through credit, commercial 
banks increase enormously the quantity of money circulating in the economy (at least 
about 95% of all money is created in this way), and the cash withdrawal of that bank 
money (credit amount) is, if not prevented altogether, significantly hindered through 
normal business practice (‘geschäftliche Gepflogenheit’), which is precisely what the 
prohibition of § 3(1)(3) envisages. And yet, the creation of bank money through credit 
by commercial banks exists in Germany as anywhere else.226 
In an attempt to solve this problem, the author conducted an interview with 
Hans Scharpf, attorney-at-law in Frankfurt am Main, Germany, 227  a specialist in 
commercial law and in the combat of white-collar crime, in his offices in Frankfurt on 
18 June 2015. Scharpf also produced information leaflets and gave talks about the 
legal foundations of the monetary system in Germany, and has been engaged in legal 
battles with banks by asserting that bank loans granted are void and unenforceable.228 
The interview focused on the following questions: the regulation of the (bank) loan in 
German private law and the prerequisites for its enforceability in court; whether or not 
bank loans are enforceable and why; the experience with banks and law courts when 
maintaining the critical position about the legality of the method of creating money by 
credit. 
The interviewee’s experience has been that the prohibition of § 3(1)(3) of the 
German Banking Act 1998 should actually cover the creation of money by way of 
credit by commercial banks, but the courts do not really engage with that legal 
argument; their only counterargument is that banks are not ‘undertakings’ or 
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businesses in the meaning of § 3, so that this prohibition is not directed at banks.229 
This view cannot be maintained because banks are undertakings in the sense of § 1 of 
the Banking Act,230 and § 3(1)(3) obviously has commercial banks in mind: these are 
the only ‘undertakings’ that can benefit from the accounting privilege of reclassifying 
deposit accounts instead of creating trust accounts, which is the basis of the money 
creation. The German and the British practices are the same. Either lack of interest, or 
lack of understanding makes the German judiciary not apply § 3 and so turns it 
effectively into a dead letter. 
Since the prohibition of § 3 does not seem to operate, Scharpf uses (also in 
litigation) a different argument to show that the money creation scheme by 
commercial banks seems incompatible with German law. The basis of this reasoning 
is private law and the loan provision of the German Civil Code or BGB. The BGB 
distinguishes between a loan of money under § 488 BGB (Gelddarlehen) and a loan 
of physical things (§ 607 BGB, Sachdarlehen). According to the rule of § 488 the 
lender’s obligation under the loan contract is to place the agreed loan amount of 
money at the borrower’s disposal. The mere crediting of bank money against the 
customer’s account is not a placing of the loan amount of money at the borrower’s 
disposal, this would only be cash. § 488 speaks of a ‘Geldbetrag’ (amount of money), 
and a clear legal definition of ‘Geld’ (money) does not exist. 231  However, legal 
commentators regard bank money as money, and so the lender’s obligation is not 
restricted to paying out in cash only,232 and there are pronouncements by the German 
Supreme Court (BGH) in this regard.233 This view is nevertheless at variance with the 
peculiar principle in German private law234 that property objects or things (Sachen) in 
law are only corporeal things (§ 90 BGB). This means that (physical) cash is a thing 
in law, but not (incorporeal) bank money, a debt, since debts/claims are not things 
according to the BGB.235 Often money is seen as an example for fungible things 
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(vertretbare Sachen, § 91 BGB),236 and one can infer this from other provisions,237 
but some authors restrict the category of fungible things to cash only.238 One could 
therefore argue that only cash, being a thing, is money, while bank money, not being a 
thing in law, is not, in which case the lender’s obligation in § 488 BGB to provide ‘an 
amount of money’ has not been discharged. The uninformed legal practice seems to 
see cash and bank money equally as ‘money’, while the BGB still adheres to a 
nineteenth-century notion of money.239 This is possibly the same with many lawyers 
who may still think that bank money is somehow backed by deposits or other (cash) 
reserves. 
A further problem is that bank money is really only a promise to deliver cash, 
but does not make cash (automatically) available to the borrower, which a strict 
reading of § 488 BGB would require.240 According to that rule, money is only made 
available to the borrower when the borrower has received the loan amount, and that is 
when the loan money has left the lender’s assets and has definitively become part of 
the borrower’s assets;241 only at this point the borrower’s duty to pay interest arises.242 
This seems to envisage the loan of a private person to another person and applies 
presumably even to bank money. But the money creation mechanism by commercial 
banks does not seem to comply with this rule: the loan money in form of bank money 
does not come from existing bank assets and does not leave the bank’s assets but 
becomes a re-classified obligation (hence the balance sheet extension in the books of 
the bank). Thus the loan is theoretically voidable, and the borrower could exercise a 
retention right and suspend repayment because the lender has not delivered.243 The 
last argument also applies if one discards the specifically German restrictive 
interpretation of things/property as being physical objects only. In accordance with 
the notion of dematerialised property, the res as the legal concept – irrespective of 
whether or not reified in some corporeal form – must finally leave the lending bank’s 
assets and must finally become part of the borrower’s assets to constitute an 
enforceable loan agreement with an enforceable claim to capital and interest.   
Mr Scharpf affirmed that the German courts consider § 488 BGB as the 
appropriate basis for bank loans and enforce claims arising from these. The lines of 
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argument set out before have, so far, not shown any real effect. The courts enforce the 
loan agreements and do not deal with any argumentation that questions the legal 
foundation of the underlying money creation system bringing about these loans. 
However, some judges seem to have voiced some doubt in private conversation that 
the legal basis of the money-creating bank loan is not that clear.244 ‘Enforcement’ can 
really mean the application of the English law equivalent of a writ of execution. At 
this point (arguably not at the point of the grant of the bank loan) property of real 
value changes hands. Where loans are embodied in a directly enforceable 
documentary title (e.g. the Hypothekenbrief, a form of asset-backed security, 
mortgage deed), enforcement by seizing immoveable property, for example, can be 
effected immediately without an intervening trial in court where submissions could be 
made.  
The interview with Mr Scharpf confirmed the author’s thesis. Money is a 
legally enforceable debt. It is the law which creates money and makes it operative, 
either through specific legislation (for example, the designation of legal tender) or 
through enforcement by the law courts of claims arising out of loans where specific 
legal rules are absent and the exact legal basis is uncertain. It is the courts’ 
recognition and enforcement of a particular sequence of accounting entries by banks 
which turns these into a normative text and confers on them the status of money 
(unlike with the same accounting procedure if done by non-banks). That may be the 
result of insufficient understanding of the money creation process as the source of the 
enforced bank loans, but, in any case, the courts’ enforcement makes bank money to 
money. Thus the usual definition of money as a means of exchange, unit of account, 
store of value does not describe adequately the essence of money. This view may 
startle economists, but they often take money for granted without much reflection. 
 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
The concept of dematerialised property explains better the phenomena of money in 
the modern commercial world. It shows that there is no conceptual reason to limit a 
definition of money to cash only and so to leave out the practically infinitely more 
important type of money, bank money as a form of debt, as older theorists of money 
have however done.245 Some assumptions lawyers make about money may derive 
from an incomplete understanding of the money creation process, especially in 
relation to bank money. A distinction between cash, bank money, credit, debt may be 
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inappropriate in view of the realities of the modern monetary system. The article has 
also demonstrated that the legal sources of the money creation process by commercial 
banks are rather obscure: they are presupposed and implied by the judiciary and legal 
practice rather than specifically regulated by the legislature. The enforcement of a 
certain system, on the assumption that it is already in existence, in fact brings the 
system into effect. Money is therefore a legally enforceable debt (obviously not all 
legally enforceable debts are money) and it is this enforceability which gives a 
phenomenon (especially a set of accounting entries) the quality of money in law as 
the instrument of payment. Goode’s pragmatic idea – what money is, is determined by 
what payment is246 – only makes sense with this theoretical underpinning. Initially it 
is not about payment, but about enforceability by way of creating a debt through a 
specific accounting method. Payment is only a consequence. 
This also shows that money is not a store of value outright, because the debt 
quality of money only embodies a value of expectation. A legal understanding of 
money also shows that the economists’ distinction between a ‘Chartalist’ or state 
theory of money247 and a functional theory of money248 is really a false dichotomy, 
because all forms of money are ultimately creatures of the law:249 where there is no 
(perceived) legal enforceability, the means of exchange will not operate as money. 
 
________________ 
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